Pilihan Auditor pada Perusahaan dengan Koneksi Politik
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24246/persi.v2i2.p109-119Kata Kunci:
Koneksi politik, pilihan auditorAbstrak
Penelitian ini menguji apakah perusahaan dengan koneksi politik memiliki kecenderungan memilih auditor. Perusahaan dengan koneksi politik memilih auditor non-Big 4 karena cenderung menutupi aktivitas rent-seeking atau tunneling dan memilih auditor non-Big 4 karena pengawasan yang longgar. Kriteria koneksi politik sesuai dengan Faccio (2006). Koneksi politik diukur dengan presentase anggota board of director dan board of comissioner yang memiliki koneksi politik terhadap total anggota board of director dan board of comissioner. Pengujian menggunakan regresi logistik. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa perusahaan dengan koneksi politik cenderung memilih auditor non-Big 4 karena auditor cenderung longgar dalam pengawasan. Dengan demikian mereka kurang mendeteksi adanya perilaku rent-seeking dan tunneling yang dilakukan oleh perusahaan.
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Referensi
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